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1. Introduction 
Measures to increase demand response in the power system may contribute to im-
prove efficiency, maintain reliability and mitigate exercise of market power (DOE, 
2005). Presently, most Norwegian households face electricity prices that might be con-
stant over weeks or seasons, and they are charged their energy consumption accumu-
lated between meter reading dates occurring only a few times a year. This does not en-
courage consumption reductions during constrained peak periods. If instead households 
face time-differentiated prices, and are metered automatically, they will be provided 
with incentives to reduce electricity usage in peak price periods. 
Time-differentiated tariffs can be designed in various ways. With time-of-use (TOU) 
rates prices vary by blocks of time within the day and are fixed and known by customers 
in advance. However, the TOU pricing scheme remains quite static because the prices in 
each time block are constant and independent of the conditions in the electricity system. 
With dynamic rates, prices can be adjusted in accordance with the system situation. An 
example of a dynamic rate is critical-peak pricing. This is related to the TOU rate, but 
has the possibility of increasing the peak price to an extra high level if the system is 
severely constrained. Even more dynamic is real-time pricing. With this rate, the price 
can change frequently, e.g., on an hourly basis, to better reflect real-time system condi-
tions. The market-based spot price is an example of this (see, for instance, Faruqui and 
George (2002) for a description of these rates). 
Several experiments using time-differentiated pricing of electricity have been carried 
out in recent decades to quantify the responsiveness of end users. A series of experi-
ments were conducted in the USA in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although results 
differ, the general findings from the analyses of these experiments are that consumers 
respond to the varying prices (Lawrence and Aigner, 1979, Aigner, 1984). Caves et al. 
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(1984) pooled data from five of the experiments and calculated a substitution elasticity 
of about 0.14.1 Later analyses of similar experiments indicate the same result: customers 
do respond to short-term price signals. For instance, Filippini (1995) found high price 
elasticities ranging from –1.25 to –1.41,2 Vaage (1995) found elasticities of substitution 
of about 0.18, Henley and Peirson (1998) reported price elasticities of –0.102 and –
0.249, Baladi et al. (1998) estimated substitution elasticities from 0.127 to 0.173, and 
Matsukawa (2001) found price elasticities of about –0.7. 
However, despite the fact that customers respond to price signals, the resulting bene-
fits have not normally been sufficiently large to justify investment in the costly equip-
ment needed for implementing the new tariff schemes (Hawdon, 1992, Braithwait, 
2000). 
This has motivated projects using enabling technologies designed to motivate or aid 
an increase in the price response. This is done either by continuously informing con-
sumers of the current price level, or by helping them to reduce consumption by, for ex-
ample, controlling loads automatically. An example is a Finnish dynamic pricing ex-
periment that used indicator lamps to warn customers that peak price periods were pos-
sibly forthcoming or in effect. Räsänen et al. (1995) found customers responded to this 
price signal by reducing consumption during peak periods by up to 71%. The “tempo 
tariff” offered by Electricité de France is an example of an approach using critical-peak 
pricing along with notification to the households of the next day’s prices. The price 
level is signalled to customers by colour signals on their meters. Aubin et al. (1995) 
found high responses in an experiment using the tempo tariff (price elasticity of –0.79).  
                                                 
1 The elasticity of substitution is a measure of the percentage change in the ratio of the peak to off-peak consumption 
as a result of a percentage change in the ratio of the peak to the off-peak price.  
2 The (own) price elasticity is a measure of the percentage change in consumption as a result of a percentage change 
in the price. A price elasticity of –0.3 is comparable to an elasticity of substitution of 0.17 (Faruqui and George, 
2002). 
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A project conducted in the USA used a critical-peak price tariff together with an in-
teractive communication system. The system allowed the utility to send a signal to the 
consumers during critical high-price periods. In addition, it allowed customers to pro-
gram and schedule some of their appliances to adjust consumption according to prices. 
Braithwait (2000) analysed data from this project, and found an elasticity of substitution 
of approximately 0.3, considered to be higher than what has been found in most other 
studies of traditional TOU programs. The results from the recently finished Statewide 
Pricing Pilot in California (Faruqui and George, 2005) further illustrate the same results. 
Although comparisons between different customer groups in the experiment should be 
made with care, the results showed that customers with enabling technologies responded 
more than customers without this equipment. 
A Norwegian residential large-scale experiment combined time-differentiated tariffs 
with automatic meter reading and direct load control. The consumers were offered a 
time-of-use tariff and real-time spot prices as incentives to adjust electricity consump-
tion according to varying prices. In addition, they were offered price-response assis-
tance by direct load control of their water heaters. Ericson et al. (2004) investigated the 
effect of the automated water heater control on the daily load shape in this experiment. 
The data analysis showed that disconnecting water heaters reduced the load by ap-
proximately 0.5 kWh/h per household on average.3 
This paper investigates new data from the Norwegian experiment. It aims to estimate 
price responses for three groups of households, which differ in their choice of tariffs and 
requests for direct load control. The panel data set, analysed with a fixed effects regres-
sion model, was collected over a six-month period. It consists of hourly metered data on 
electricity consumption from 312 households (nearly 800,000 data points), along with 
                                                 
3 A typical water heater in Norway has a capacity of 200 litres and a heating element of 2 kW. 
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the number of hours of daylight per day and measurements of local temperatures and 
wind speeds. 
The results indicate that customers with TOU and spot prices, without direct load 
control, were most responsive to the price variation. Customers with TOU and standard 
power tariffs, without direct load control, and customers with TOU and spot prices and 
direct load control of water heaters had small responses to the prices. 
2. Experiment and data 
“End-user Flexibility by Efficient Use of Information and Communication Technol-
ogy” (2001–2004) was a Norwegian project where automatic meter reading and direct 
load control technology was installed in residential dwellings. The project developed 
and tested the use of time-differentiated network and power tariffs, and direct load con-
trol of water heaters. The electricity consumption of each household was metered every 
hour from 3 November 2003 to 25 April 2004, i.e., for 4200 hours. 
2.1. Samples 
Before the test period started, all customers had standard flat network tariffs and 
standard power tariffs.4 The project was a voluntary “opt-in” program, and the custom-
ers were given different participation choices. They could choose a TOU tariff from the 
network company and/or the market based spot price tariff from a power company. If 
they chose the spot price alternative, they had the further option of direct load control of 
their water heaters. The disconnections of the heaters would normally occur in the two 
most expensive spot price hours, every morning and evening. Depending on the cus-
                                                 
4 After the deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market in 1991, vertically integrated power companies were 
separated into generating or trading divisions and network divisions. Customers now face one network tariff from 
their local net supplier, and one power tariff from a power supplier, which can be freely chosen from competing 
companies. Therefore, a consumer's total electricity price will be made up of the network price plus the power price 
(plus taxes and VAT). 
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tomers’ choices, they divided into groups with differing combinations of standard 
and/or new tariffs, and with/without direct load control of water heaters. 
This paper studies three different samples from the panel of customers. The samples 
are grouped according to their choice of tariff and their choice regarding water heater 
disconnection. Table 1 shows the customer groups, the number of households in each 
group, and the total number of observations in each group. 
Table 1. Customer groups (abbreviations in parentheses), the number of house-
holds in each group, and the total number of observations in each group 
Customer group No. of households No. of observations
TOU net tariff & standard power tariff (TOU/Std)  171 415,841 
TOU net tariff & spot price power tariff (TOU/spot) 7 19,289 
TOU net tariff & spot price power tariff & 
direct load control (TOU/spot/DLC) 134 343,138 
Note: Approximately 150 of the households in the TOU/Std group are only “semi-volunteers”. They 
originally chose a dynamic tariff that activated high peak prices only when temperatures fell below –8 °C. 
This tariff was terminated at the beginning of January 2004 and the customers were automatically trans-
ferred to the normal TOU tariff, with the option of opting out if they refused this rate (approximately 10 
percent refused the new tariff). Only observations from the period with the normal TOU tariff (later than 
5 January 2004) are included in the analysis of those customers. 
2.2. Tariffs 
The TOU network tariff had a two-level rate structure with a peak price of approxi-
mately NOK5 0.91 in hours 8–11 (7 am–11am) and hours 17–20 (4 pm–8 pm) on work-
ing days, and an off-peak price of approximately NOK 0.03 in all other hours of work-
ing days, weekends, and holidays.6 The power tariff was the next day’s hourly spot 
prices, settled in the day-ahead market at Nord Pool. Figure 1 shows average, minimum, 
and maximum daily spot prices during the test period. 
                                                 
5 NOK 1 ≈ EUR 0.12 and USD 0.15 
6 Tax and VAT (24%) are not included. In 2003, a tax of approximately NOK 0.10 was added to the power price. In 
2004, this tax was shifted to the network price. 
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Figure 1. Average, minimum, and maximum daily spot prices from November 
2003 to May 2004 
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Figure 1 reveals two important characteristics of the spot price during the test period. 
First, the average daily level was quite stable. Over the first 1½ months, the price re-
mained at a level of about NOK 0.30 and, for the rest of the period, it remained at a 
level of approximately NOK 0.25. Second, the average difference between the mini-
mum and maximum hourly spot price for each day was below NOK 0.03. Only on nine 
days did the difference exceed NOK 0.05 and, on four of those days, the difference ex-
ceeded NOK 0.10. To exemplify the hourly price variation the consumers were faced 
with, Figure 2 shows the spot price for one typical day (15 November) and one non-
typical day (22 January), along with the TOU rate for working days. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that, on most days, the spot price provided only small incen-
tives for consumers to alter their consumption. In other words, the TOU tariff was by far 
the most powerful price signal when it came to encouraging intra-daily changes in elec-
tricity consumption, for all three consumer groups. The price ratio (peak price/off-peak 
price) of the TOU rate, disregarding the power rate and taxes, is very high. However, as 
the total price faced by the consumers consists of the network price plus the power price 
plus taxes and VAT, the average total price ratio that the consumers actually face is 
lower (approximately 3.2:1). 
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Figure 2. Hourly spot price on a typical (15 November) and non-typical day (22 
January), and the TOU tariff 
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2.3. Direct load control 
The disconnections and reconnections of the water heaters’ electricity circuits were 
carried out by direct contact with a relay in each household’s fuse box. The load control 
was a service accompanied with the spot price tariff, and performed in conjunction with 
the hours when the spot price was expected to be highest (hours 9, 10, 18, and 19).   
The load control events were not timed in accordance with the network TOU tariff. 
Because the water heaters were reconnected at the beginning of the last hour of the 
TOU peak price period, the water heater energy restoration for the first hour after re-
connection did not take place when the TOU price was low, but when the price was still 
high. Thus, the length of a heater’s normal recovery period, without any interruption, 
determined whether a household gained from the disconnection with respect to the TOU 
tariff. If the recovery period normally took one hour or less, all consumption would be 
shifted to the hour when the TOU price was high and these consumers would probably 
not gain from the load control. On the other hand, if the recovery period normally took 
more than one hour, some of the hot water recovery would take place in the low-price 
period. Consequently, these consumers would shift parts of their consumption from 
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TOU peak to off-peak price hours, and gain from the load control, not only with respect 
to the spot price power tariff, but also with respect to the TOU network tariff. 
2.4. Household electricity consumption 
The time-differentiated tariffs are intended to provide customers with incentives to 
adjust their electricity consumption patterns throughout the day. Figure 3 shows the 
average daily load curve (average consumption per hour) in the test period for the three 
groups with differentiated rates and a reference group. The reference group consists of 
754 households that did not volunteer for the new rates. They had no incentives to alter 
their daily load curve, and are included to enable visual comparisons between the 
groups. 
Figure 3. Average daily load curve for the groups with time-differentiated rates 
and a reference group 
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As seen in Figure 3, the reference group with standard network and power tariffs has 
a smooth daily load curve. There are morning and afternoon peaks corresponding to the 
hours when people are usually at home, and off-peak periods in the middle of the day 
and at night, which correspond to the hours when people are at work or asleep. This 
load curve reflects the typical consumption pattern for households that do not face 
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variations in price during the day, and thus have no incentive to change their electricity 
consumption behaviour. 
The groups with TOU and standard power tariffs without direct load control 
(TOU/Std) and with TOU and spot prices with direct load control (TOU/spot/DLC) 
have higher overall consumption levels than the reference group. In addition, it appears 
that these two groups consume more electricity in the early morning hours, when the 
price is low, compared with the reference group. This is illustrated by their consumption 
curve which seems to increase more in those hours. Following the same argument, it 
does not appear that these two groups have reduced their consumption in hour 8, which 
is a high-price hour. For the TOU/spot/DLC group, we see the effect of the disconnec-
tions in hours 9, 10, 18, and 19, when consumption drops. The effect of the reconnec-
tions is seen in hours 11 and 20. Consumption increases in these hours owing to the 
postponed water heater recovery.7 
The group with TOU and spot price without direct load control (TOU/spot) differ 
from the other two test groups, as overall consumption level is lower. In addition, their 
consumption pattern is well adjusted to the TOU peak and off-peak prices. Their con-
sumption seems to fall substantially in high-price periods and to increase in the low-
price periods. 
As Figure 3 shows, the consumption curves of all three groups differ from the refer-
ence group in their consumption level and/or in their pattern during the day. As the cus-
tomers participated on a voluntarily basis, one could argue that the time-differentiated 
tariffs were chosen either by households that could easily alter their consumption  
                                                 
7 Consumption will remain high in subsequent hours also, but will not be as high as in the first hour after 
reconnection. Among other factors, consumption depends on the level of hot water used in each household and the 
time required to recover lost energy from the hot water consumption. This so-called payback or cold load pickup 
effect resulting from simultaneous reconnections is discussed in, e.g., Gomes et al. (1999), Orphelin and Adnot 
(1999), and van Tonder and Lane (1996). 
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pattern or by households with a favourable load profile. If the sample consisted 
purely of the former type of customers, the utility could expect a demand response from 
its customers. However, if the sample consisted only of the latter type, reductions might 
actually not have taken place because these customers simply could continue their prior 
consumption behaviour during the experiment, and gain from the tariff without chang-
ing their consumption. Thus, it is important to know whether this type of self-selection 
is prevalent among the customers. Ericson (2005) investigated this issue among custom-
ers in the TOU/Std group and found that the load pattern of this group did not differ 
significantly from a group that chose to remain on their standard tariff. This indicates 
that self-selection based on favourable load patterns is not prevailing and that any load 
reductions measured in the analyses in the present paper is a result of adjustments to the 
price, at least for the TOU/Std group. 
Summary statistics for electricity consumption for working days are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of electricity consumption [kWh/h] for the groups 
with time-differentiated tariffs and the reference group (working days) 
Customer group Period Mean Std 
dev. 
Median Min. Max. 
Off-
peak 
2.12 1.43 1.8 0.1 17.6Reference  
Peak 2.38 1.59 2.0 0.1 25.8
Off-
peak 
2.50 1.48 2.2 0.1 14.7TOU net tariff & standard 
power tariff 
(TOU/Std) 
Peak 2.78 1.63 2.5 0.1 14.9
Off-
peak 
2.23 1.24 2.1 0.1 9.6TOU net tariff & spot 
price power tariff  
(TOU/spot) 
Peak 1.92 0.98 1.7 0.1 8.3
Off-
peak 
2.58 1.44 2.3 0.1 16.8TOU net tariff & spot 
price power tariff & direct 
load control 
(TOU/spot/DLC) 
Peak 2.81 1.56 2.5 0.1 15.9
Note: Peak (hours 8–11, 17–20 in working days) and off-peak (the remaining hours) are related to the 
high and low TOU rate periods, respectively. 
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2.5. Temperature and wind data 
In addition to the electricity consumption data, hourly observations of average out-
door temperature and wind speed, and hours of daylight each day are available. These 
data are shown in Table 3. Temperature and wind data are measured at a central point in 
the vicinity of the customers. 
Table 3. Summary statistics for temperature, wind, and number of daylight hours 
(all days) 
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max. 
Temp [°C] 0.5 5.6 –16.3 16.7 
Wind [m/s] 1.5 0.8 0.3 6.6 
Daylight [hour] 9.0 2.8 5.9 15.2 
 
The variation in the weather variables was high with temperatures from –16 to +16 
ºC and wind speeds reaching up to 6 m/s. This variation captures much of the tempera-
ture and wind conditions often experienced in these seasons in Norway. The number of 
hours of daylight each day varied from 5.9 (in December) to 15.2 (in April), with an 
average of nine hours. 
3. Method and model 
The regression model presented in this section is developed to predict the electricity 
consumption of customers at every hour during the whole test period. Analyses will be 
performed simultaneously on the three groups with the time-differentiated tariffs: the 
TOU/spot, TOU/Std, and TOU/spot/DLC groups. The goal is to find the extent to which 
the groups responded to the varying prices by adjusting consumption. The price re-
sponses will be captured in price coefficients, one for each of the three groups, and are 
measured as changes in kWh/h to changes in price (where the hourly price is the sum of 
the network and the power price in each hour, and taxes and VAT). 
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Variations in outside temperature and wind speed, number of hours of daylight each 
day, household specific characteristics, and time of day, week, and year are controlled 
for in the regression. As described earlier, self-selection based on an advantageous load 
pattern in the TOU/Std group did not appear to be prevalent, as indicated by the results 
in Ericson (2005). This is assumed to be the case for the TOU/spot and the 
TOU/spot/DLC groups also. Hence, no measure for testing or controlling for this is in-
cluded. 
3.1. Econometric specification 
In this analysis, the households’ utility is assumed to depend on their consumption of 
electricity and all other goods and services. The consumption of electricity depends on 
the stock of electrical appliances because electricity does not give the household utility 
per se, but has to be used along with such equipment to obtain utility (for instance, when 
preparing hot meals, washing clothes, watching television, and heating water or rooms). 
The households are assumed to maximize their utility given all prices and income. This 
gives the households’ demand for electricity and other goods as a function of all prices, 
incomes, their stock of appliances, and other household characteristics. Households’ 
demand for electricity is approximated by:  
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where: 
yit  = hourly electricity consumption [kWh/h], at time t for household i; 
pit  = electricity price [NOK] for household i, at time t ; 
dlt  = daylight; 1 between sunrise and sunset, 0 else; 
Tt  = temperature [ºC], at time t; 
2
tT   = temperature, squared, at time t; 
TMAt  = Moving average of temperature last 24 hours, at time t;    
2
tTMA  = Moving average of temperature last 24 hours, squared, at time t;   
Wt  = Wind [m/s], at time t; 
WMAt = Moving average of wind last 24 hours, at time t; 
trigj,t   = trigonometric terms, taking the value sin(πh/6), sin(πh/8), sin(πh/12), 
cos(πh/6), cos(πh/12), for j=1,…,5, respectively, if t is in hour h of the day, 
for weekends and holidays (see Appendix A for more detailed information); 
Di,g  = dummy variables; 1 if household i belongs to group g, 0 else; 
Dh,t  = dummy variables; 1 if t is in hour h of the day, 0 else;  
Dd,t  = dummy variables; 1 if t is in day d of the week, 0 else;  
Dm,t  = dummy variables; 1 if t is in month m of the year, 0 else; 
DHd,t  = dummy variable; 1 if t is in a holiday, 0 else; 
γi  = fixed time invariant effect for household i; and 
εit  = an error term, assumed to be independently distributed over i and t with 
a constant variance.8 
 
N represents the sum of all households i. T is the same for all groups (4200), al-
though missing data will make some time series incomplete (an unbalanced panel). 
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The price responses will be captured by one price coefficient for each group as the 
effect of price changes is assumed to be different for the three groups. Further, it is nec-
essary to control for other important factors influencing electricity consumption. They 
are discussed briefly below. 
The influence of temperature on energy use is particularly important in countries 
with substantial climatic variations. The effect is well described in the literature, al-
though no uniform way of including temperature in the models has been established. 
The different analyses have found that temperature changes may have non-linear, as 
well as delayed effects on electricity consumption. These findings are covered by, e.g., 
Henley and Peirson (1997, 1998), Granger et al. (1979), Harvey and Koopman (1993), 
and Ramanathan et al. (1997). Following Granger et al. (1979), the contemporary tem-
perature is controlled for by one term, and its possible non-linear influence by a squared 
term. To account for the delayed effect of a temperature change, a 24-hour arithmetic 
moving average term as well as its squared value in another term is used. 
Wind might influence energy use as it increases a building’s heat loss (SINTEF, 
1996). Both a contemporary term and a 24-hour moving average term are included. 
These are not squared as wind is anticipated to affect the heat transfer processes from 
buildings in a linear way (Mills, 1995). Because the households in the sample are lo-
cated within the same area, all dwellings are assumed to be exposed to the same weather 
conditions over the data collection period. 
Daylight is likely to influence the consumption of electricity because it decreases the 
need for electric lights and heating (see, for instance, Johnsen, 2001). To allow for dif-
ferent impacts of daylight over the seasons, variables intended to pick up the daylight’s 
                                                                                                                                     
8 The Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used to obtain robust estimates of the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2003). 
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impact in each month is included. Each variable takes the value one in the hours be-
tween sunrise and sunset in the existing month, and zero otherwise.9 
In high-frequency data like those used here, a large part of the variation in the data is 
caused by seasonal and cyclical patterns. Seasonal factors (e.g. rain, snow, humidity), or 
special periods such as Christmas and New Year, might lead to different consumption 
levels, depending on the season. Cyclical patterns over the week might appear if, e.g., 
consumption is higher on weekends compared with weekdays. Also important, are the 
cyclical patterns of the day. Most people sleep at night, make breakfast and leave for 
work in the morning, and come home for dinner in the afternoon in a more or less simi-
lar pattern every day, and the electricity consumption reflects this behaviour. All the 
variables explaining these cycles cannot possibly be obtained, but they should still be 
accounted for in the model. Different approaches have been used in the literature to con-
trol for these patterns. Seasonal and weekly cycles can be controlled for by dummy 
variables (Pardo et al., 2002). Cycles within the day have been treated with dummy 
variables, one dummy for each hour (Granger et al., 1979, Ramanathan et al., 1985), by 
trigonometric terms (Granger et al., 1979), or by cubic splines (Hendricks et al., 1979, 
Harvey and Koopman, 1993). In the current paper, the cyclical patterns are modelled 
with dummies; one set with dummies for the 24 hours of the day.10 As weekends and 
holidays have different consumption patterns compared with working days, trigonomet-
ric terms are included to allow for shifts in the consumption pattern. After some ex-
perimentation, five variables were found to represent the daily cycle for these days; they 
are defined as sin(πh/6), sin(πh/8), sin(πh/12), cos(πh/6), and cos(πh/12), where h is the 
                                                 
9 In the sunrise or sunset hour, the value of a daylight variable is equal to the share of the hour which it is daylight, 
i.e. between 0 and 1. 
10 Consumption patterns for different working days were found to differ slightly. Regressions with inclusions of 
separate hour dummies for each weekday were tested, and found to increase the estimates of the price responses, but 
only to a small extent. Because such a specification is not very parsimonious, and it is computationally heavy, it was 
not considered worth the extra effort. 
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hour of the day. They do not enter on other days (see Appendix A for a more detailed 
explanation). Possible different levels in usage between the different days of the week 
or months are controlled for by day and month dummies. In addition, a holiday dummy 
is included. To avoid multicollinearity, the hour-01, Monday, and November dummies 
are excluded. 
The households’ specific characteristics (income, stock of appliances, type of dwell-
ing, etc.) are important factors that can account for differences in electricity consump-
tion behaviour. Such variables are not included in the model, but heterogeneity between 
the households is accounted for by fixed (unobserved) effects with the estimation pro-
cedure presented in the next session. Therefore, their impact on electricity consumption 
is not commented on further. 
The errors may have an autoregressive structure, where for instance special attention 
is devoted to residual autocorrelation at lag 1 (corresponding to the previous period), at 
lag 24 (corresponding to the same hour the previous day) and at lag 168 (corresponding 
to the same hour one week ago). No specification of autoregressive structures is done, 
since our software, Stata, only allow specifications of first-order for panel data. The 
estimators will anyway be consistent, but they are not efficient (Baltagi, 2001).  
3.2. Estimation method 
It is likely that the consumption patterns vary between customers with different 
demographic or household characteristics. For instance, it is likely that households with 
larger dwellings, higher incomes, more electrical appliances, or more family members 
will use more electricity than others. As the experiment lasted only six months, such 
characteristics are assumed to be constant during the test period. The cross section time 
series dimension of the data gives the opportunity to control for such household specific 
time-invariant explanatory variables by the use of a fixed effects panel data model. The 
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fixed effects model controls for factors that are anticipated to not change within the 
timeframe of this experiment (see, e.g., Baltagi, 2001). This reduces heteroskedasticity 
and gives more efficient results.  
4. Results 
The analysis of the three groups’ price responses is performed in one regression, with 
one separate price variable for each group to estimate the response to the total hourly 
price facing the customers. Table 4 shows the results from the fixed effects regression 
using Stata (StataCorp, 2005). 
Table 4. Results from the fixed effects regression 
Variables Estimate t-value p-value 
Price: TOU/spot -0.5453 -35.94 0.000 
Price: TOU/Std -0.0556 -8.58 0.000 
Price: TOU/spot/DLC -0.0771 -11.57 0.000 
Daylight: November -0.0698 -5.54 0.000 
Daylight: December 0.0118 0.88 0.380 
Daylight: January -0.0450 -5.48 0.000 
Daylight: February -0.1277 -17.36 0.000 
Daylight: March -0.1229 -18.28 0.000 
Daylight: April -0.0716 -10.06 0.000 
Temp -0.0286 -58.41 0.000 
Temp2 -0.0008 -20.91 0.000 
TempMA -0.0342 -61.24 0.000 
TempMA2 0.0001 1.87 0.061 
Wind 0.0109 6.08 0.000 
WindMA 0.0463 15.25 0.000 
Constant 2.2923 233.33 0.000 
R2: within  = 0.2024 F(71,777907)     = 2674.74 
between  = 0.0022 p-value for F-test = 0.0000 
overall  = 0.1065   
Note: The results for the holiday and cyclical dummy variables for hours, days, and months, and the 
trigonometric terms are reported in Appendix B. 
 
Table 4 shows that the price-response coefficients for the three groups are all signifi-
cantly different from zero. Furthermore, F-tests indicate that the different price coeffi-
cients are significantly different from each other. 
The results from the TOU/spot group are much higher than those for the other two 
groups. The estimated price response indicates a reduction in electricity usage of 0.545 
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kWh/h in response to an increase in price of 1 NOK. Assuming a linear price response 
and calculating the peak price elasticity using average price and electricity consumption 
values, the price elasticity is approximately –0.26.11 Thus, the result is of the same mag-
nitude as many of the findings from TOU experiments described in the Introduction. 
This group seems to have a higher ability and willingness to respond to the price varia-
tions than the other groups analysed in this paper. The TOU/spot group chose two inde-
pendent rates that exposed them to the possibility of high volatility in prices, and high 
prices in the peak periods when consumption usually is higher. They did not choose 
direct load control with its prospective load reducing assistance. An explanation for 
their stronger response might be that these customers chose this riskier combination of 
tariffs because they relied on their own energy-controlling systems that could be pro-
grammed to exploit the tariff structure. Although this group consisted only of a few cus-
tomers, their response gives an indication of the potential that might exist in households 
that are motivated and able to adjust consumption to varying price signals. 
The estimated coefficients for the other two groups are smaller than for the TOU/spot 
group. For the TOU/Std group, we can see that electricity consumption declines by 
0.055 kWh/h in response to a price increase of 1 NOK. Thus, the price elasticity is cal-
culated to be –0.02. An explanation for the weak response might be that households 
generally do not give their electricity consumption much attention, and want to take 
intra-daily price changes into account to a small extent only. The result may simply re-
flect that the end users in general are not very price responsive. However, it might be 
that a higher degree of information and frequent reminders of the tariff they have chosen 
are required for customers with a low interest in adjusting their electricity consumption. 
The customers received little information before and during the experiment about the 
                                                 
11 The average off-peak and peak prices, including taxes and VAT, were approximately NOK 0.50 and NOK 1.60, 
respectively. 
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various ways they could exploit the electricity rate structures. As these types of rates 
were new and unknown to the customers, more attention and guidance on how to bene-
fit from the varying prices may have increased the price response. Another explanation 
might be that the peak/off-peak price ratio was too small to motivate price-responsive 
behaviour from this group. Experience from earlier TOU experiments indicates that the 
largest consumption reductions are found when the peak to off-peak price ratio is high-
est (Faruqui and Malko, 1983) and that peak to off-peak price ratios should be in the 
range of 4:1 to 5:1 to induce substantial price responses (Braithwait, 2000). The price 
ratio in this experiment was approximately 3.2:1. Therefore, it may not have been suffi-
ciently high to motivate the consumers to make consumption adjustments. 
The TOU/spot/DLC group had a weak response, but it was somewhat stronger than 
that of the TOU/Std group. Electricity usage was reduced by 0.077 kWh/h in response 
to a price increase of 1 NOK (indicating a price elasticity of approximately –0.03, again 
assuming linear price responses). The estimate must be seen in the light of that the 
households in this group were exposed to automated load control. As was the case for 
the TOU/spot group, customers in this group chose two tariffs, which in combination 
could expose them to substantial price variations within the day. This might suggest that 
they had a high willingness and ability to be price responsive, as was seen in the 
TOU/spot group. However, instead of relying on their own energy-controlling systems 
to yield benefits from the price structure, they may have anticipated that the direct load 
control offered in conjunction with the spot price tariff would take care of their price 
response. Therefore, these customers may have taken little action on their own to re-
spond to the price signals (regressions that control for the impact of the load control 
indicate slightly lower responses than for the TOU/Std group, thus indicating that the 
customers have done little efforts to respond to the price changes manually). That the 
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estimate for the TOU/spot/DLC group is low, despite the fact that they had load control, 
may be due to that the spot price did not vary much within the day during the experi-
ment. Thus, there was little to gain from shifting consumption from peak spot price 
hours to off-peak spot price hours. It may further indicate that a large share of the load 
was shifted only within the TOU peak price periods. It is probable that greater effects 
for the customers would have been experienced if the water heaters had been recon-
nected at the end of the TOU peak price periods instead of when the TOU price was still 
high. This could be achieved if, e.g., the water heaters had been disconnected for the 
entire TOU peak price periods. If this had occurred, the customers could have achieved 
benefits from shifting consumption out of possible high spot prices as well as the TOU 
peak prices. The result suggests that, if customers have two separate time-differentiated 
electricity tariffs from their network and power supplier, the timing of the load control 
measures in one of the tariffs might take into account the price structure of the other 
tariff in order to increase the benefits for the customers. 
For the other estimates, we can see that the temperature coefficients are all signifi-
cant. The negative contemporary linear and squared terms indicate that consumption 
will increase if the temperature drops from one hour to the next, but a temperature drop 
will have less impact as the weather becomes colder. The negative linear and positive 
squared moving average term indicates that, if the average temperature for the previous 
24 hours drops, consumption will increase and the increase will be greater the colder it 
is. 
The wind coefficient estimates are both positive and significant. As expected, wind 
increases electricity consumption. 
All daylight variables except that for December are negative and significant. How-
ever, the December variable is not significant. This means that more daylight will de-
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crease electricity consumption, as expected. We see that daylight has a greater impact 
during the months with more hours of light. The reason why daylight in April is esti-
mated to cause less of a reduction in consumption as daylight in, say, February or 
March, may be that people heat their dwellings to a lesser degree at that time of the 
year. Thus, daylight does not replace electricity for heating in April to the same extent 
as it does in February and March. 
The F-statistic test related to the hypothesis that all the coefficients except the inter-
cept are jointly zero, is reported in Table 4. The hypothesis is clearly rejected, which 
suggests that the model has substantial explanatory power. 
Finally, we mention that regressions were run for each of the groups separately to see 
whether this had an impact on the estimates. These results show price responses of –
0.627 kWh/h for the TOU/spot group, –0.067 kWh/h for the TOU/Std group, and –
0.066 kWh/h for the TOU/spot/DLC group. Thus, the estimates can be said to be robust 
as the responses are small and in the same range regardless of the specification for the 
TOU/Std and TOU/spot/DLC groups, and high and in the same range for the TOU/spot 
group. 
5. Conclusions 
A fixed effects panel data model uses data from a Norwegian residential experiment 
to estimate price responses to TOU and spot pricing as well as direct load control of 
water heaters. 
The results show that the customers with TOU and spot price tariffs without direct 
load control responded to a 1 NOK increase in price with a 0.545 kWh/h consumption 
reduction. Customers with a TOU network tariff and standard power tariff without dis-
connections responded to changes in price with a smaller adjustment in consumption 
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(0.055 kWh/h). The customers with TOU and spot price tariffs with disconnections of 
water heaters had a small but somewhat higher response than the latter group (0.077 
kWh/h). 
These results indicate that the residential electricity consumers analysed were not 
very price responsive, as only one group with a few customers had a substantial re-
sponse to the prices. However, the results indicate only the average response for all cus-
tomers within each group and no attempts were made to reveal whether there existed 
subgroups with higher price responsiveness. The response found in one of the groups 
indicates that some customers are highly motivated and able to exploit the varying rates 
by adjusting consumption. For instance, it is likely that customers with equipment 
suited to taking advantage of the price structure by reducing or shifting consumption 
would have shown higher responses.  
It may be that the provision of more information to the participating customers be-
fore and during the experiment on how they could have benefited from the rates could 
have increased the response. Furthermore, the direct load control would most likely 
have resulted in a higher response had the timing of the control events been conducted 
not only in accordance with the spot price power tariff but also in accordance with the 
TOU tariff. This suggests that, if customers have two separate time-differentiated elec-
tricity tariffs (network and power tariffs), one may consider taking into account the 
price structure of those two contracts when deciding the timing of load control measures 
in order to increase customers’ economic savings from participation in time differenti-
ated pricing programs. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix explains how the trigonometric variables accounting for weekend and 
holiday effects are constructed. 
Let Xj be an arbitrary household invariant variable for which one has observations 
Xj1, Xj2, ..., XjT. 
The variable is measured on an hourly basis. Let us assume that Xj,1 and Xj,T corre-
spond to the value of the variable Xj in the first hour of a Monday (the initial day) and 
the last hour of a Sunday (the last day), such that we consider complete weeks. Let us 
collect the observations in a vector, that is 
/
j j1 j2 jTX X , X , ..., X⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
X  may be partitioned in blocks corresponding to the different days, that is 
// / /
j j1 j2 jKX B , B , ..., B⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ , 
where Bjk is a column vector with 24 elements, corresponding to the hours of an arbi-
trary day, and where K=T/24. We have for instance 
 
/
j1 j1 j2 j24B X , X , ..., X⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ , 
/
j2 j,25 j,26 j,48B X , X , ..., X⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  and 
/
jK j,T 23 j,T 22 j,TB X , X , ..., X− −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
For all the cases below one has that Bjk = Bj ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., K.  This means that we 
may write 
j N jX e B= ⊗ , 
where Ke  is a column vector with K elements, which all are equal to 1 and where ⊗  
denotes the Kronecker-product. We will consider the five following Bj vectors:   
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[ ]/1B sin(1 / 6), sin(2 / 6), ..., sin(24 / 6)= π π π , 
[ ]/2B sin(1 / 8), sin(2 / 8), ..., sin(24 / 8)= π π π , 
[ ]/3B sin(1 /12), sin(2 /12), ..., sin(24 /12)= π π π , 
[ ]/4B cos(1 / 6), cos(2 / 6), ..., cos(24 / 6)= π π π  and 
[ ]/5B cos(1 /12), cos(2 /12), ..., cos(24 /12)= π π π . 
 
Let furthermore D be a dummy variable with values 1 2 TD ,D ,...,D  such that Dt is one 
if the hour corresponds to an hour on a Saturday, a Sunday or a holiday and zero in all 
other cases. We define the vector D  by 
[ ]/1 2 TD D , D , ..., D= . 
We consider the following vectors 
,5,...,1j,DXZ jj =⊗=  
 
where ⊗  denotes the Hadamard-product (that is elementwise multiplication). We may 
write  
/
j j,1 j,2 j,TZ Z , Z , ..., Z⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . 
The total effect of the five Z-variables in period t may be written as 
5
j j,t
j 1
Z
=
κ∑ , which 
corresponds to 
5
trig, j j,t
j 1
trig
=
β∑  in Eq. (1). 
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Appendix B 
Table 5. Results from the fixed effects regression 
Coefficients Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
δTOU/spot DTOU/spot p Price: TOU/spot -0.5453 -35.94 0.000 
δTOU/Std DTOU/Std p Price: TOU/Std -0.0556 -8.58 0.000 
δTOU/spot/DLC DTOU/spot/DLC p Price: TOU/spot/DLC -0.0771 -11.57 0.000 
βdl,nov Dnov dl Daylight: November -0.0698 -5.54 0.000 
βdl,dec Ddec dl Daylight: December 0.0118 0.88 0.380 
βdl,jan Djan dl Daylight: January -0.0450 -5.48 0.000 
βdl,feb Dfeb dl Daylight: February -0.1277 -17.36 0.000 
βdl,mar Dmar dl Daylight: March -0.1229 -18.28 0.000 
βdl,apr Dapr dl Daylight: April -0.0716 -10.06 0.000 
βT T Temp -0.0286 -58.41 0.000 
βT2 T2 Temp, squared -0.0008 -20.91 0.000 
βTMA TMA Temp, moving average -0.0342 -61.24 0.000 
βTMA2 TMA2 Temp, moving average, squared 0.0001 1.87 0.061 
βW W Wind 0.0109 6.08 0.000 
βWMA WMA Wind, moving average 0.0463 15.25 0.000 
β2 D2 Dummy, hour 2 -0.0955 -14.14 0.000 
β3 D3 Dummy, hour 3 -0.1193 -17.47 0.000 
β4 D4 Dummy, hour 4 -0.0991 -14.42 0.000 
β5 D5 Dummy, hour 5 -0.0410 -5.95 0.000 
β6 D6 Dummy, hour 6 0.0932 13.14 0.000 
β7 D7 Dummy, hour 7 0.3004 39.10 0.000 
β8 D8 Dummy, hour 8 0.5345 51.39 0.000 
β9 D9 Dummy, hour 9 0.5512 50.67 0.000 
β10 D10 Dummy, hour 10 0.5520 47.84 0.000 
β11 D11 Dummy, hour 11 0.6368 54.67 0.000 
β12 D12 Dummy, hour 12 0.4650 47.33 0.000 
β13 D13 Dummy, hour 13 0.3572 36.92 0.000 
β14 D14 Dummy, hour 14 0.3358 34.57 0.000 
β15 D15 Dummy, hour 15 0.3832 39.04 0.000 
β16 D16 Dummy, hour 16 0.4895 50.81 0.000 
β17 D17 Dummy, hour 17 0.6348 58.32 0.000 
β18 D18 Dummy, hour 18 0.6477 60.73 0.000 
β19 D19 Dummy, hour 19 0.6807 64.94 0.000 
β20 D20 Dummy, hour 20 0.8283 78.68 0.000 
β21 D21 Dummy, hour 21 0.6974 85.37 0.000 
β22 D22 Dummy, hour 22 0.5966 77.34 0.000 
β23 D23 Dummy, hour 23 0.4416 61.07 0.000 
β24 D24 Dummy, hour 24 0.2099 29.26 0.000 
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Coefficients Variables Explanation Estimate t-value p-value
βtrig,1 trig1 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/6) 0.1120 29.17 0.000 
βtrig,2 trig2 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/8) 0.2089 11.82 0.000 
βtrig,3 trig3 Trigonometric term, Sin(πh/12) -0.0991 -29.02 0.000 
βtrig,4 trig4 Trigonometric term, Cos(πh/6) 0.2003 19.10 0.000 
βtrig,5 trig5 Trigonometric term, Cos(πh/12) -0.2611 -18.78 0.000 
βtue Dtue Dummy, Tuesday 0.0408 10.08 0.000 
βwed Dwed Dummy, Wednesday 0.0238 5.86 0.000 
βthu Dthu Dummy, Thursday -0.0131 -3.20 0.001 
βfri Dfri Dummy, Friday -0.0048 -1.18 0.239 
βsat Dsat Dummy, Saturday -0.0066 -1.12 0.261 
βsun Dsun Dummy, Sunday 0.0324 5.40 0.000 
βdec Ddec Dummy, December 0.2032 24.60 0.000 
βjan Djan Dummy, January 0.1410 19.29 0.000 
βfeb Dfeb Dummy, February 0.0047 0.66 0.509 
βmar Dmar Dummy, March -0.0422 -5.91 0.000 
βapr Dapr Dummy, April -0.2086 -25.90 0.000 
βHd DHd Dummy, Holiday 0.0345 5.02 0.000 
  Constant 2.2923 233.33 0.000 
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